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Responses to Corporate Versus 
Individual Wrongdoing* 
Valerie P. Hanst and M. David Ermannt 
For many years, researchers assumed that the public was indifferent to corporate wrongdoing, but 
recent surveys have discovered evidence to the contrary. Taking insights from these data a step 
further, this study employed an experimental design to examine whether people responded differently 
to corporate versus individual wrongdoers. We varied the identity of the central actor in a scenario 
involving harm to workers. Half the respondents were informed that a corporation caused the harm; 
the remainder were told that an individual did so. Respondents applied a higher standard of respon- 
sibility to the corporate actor. For identical actions, the corporation was judged as more reckless and 
more morally wrong than the individual. Respondents' judgments of the greater recklessness of the 
corporation led them to recommend higher civil and criminal penalties against the corporation. 
Does the public advocate strong sanctions against corporate wrongdoing? Many 
scholars have lamented that community sentiment toward business is so favorable 
that even when a corporation deserves punishment the public does not support it 
(Geis, 1973; Ross, 1907; Sutherland, 1949/1983). Other scholars have taken the 
opposite point of view, asserting that strong antibusiness sentiment leads to public 
condemnation of corporate misdeeds (Cook, 1893; Cullen, Maakestad, & Caven- 
der, 1987; McCormick, 1977). 
Public opinion surveys provide support for both beliefs. Contemporary polls 
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indicate that the majority of the public holds favorable views of business, describ- 
ing the free enterprise system as "the major reason for our higher standard of 
living," and agreeing that "what's good for business is good for the average 
person" (Roper & Miller, 1985, pp. 12-13). Despite this overall favorability, re- 
search in the post-Watergate era (Clinard & Yeager, 1980; Cullen, Mathers, Clark, 
& Cullen, 1983; Grabosky, Braithwaite, & Wilson, 1987; Schrager & Short, 1978) 
and even earlier (Gibbons, 1969; Newman, 1957; Rossi, Waite, Bose, & Berk, 
1974) has shown that the public recognizes the problem of white-collar crime and 
desires punishment. Furthermore, the public believes that wrongdoing by the 
powerful is widespread (Opinion Roundup, 1986) and costly (Cullen et al., 1983). 
Thus considerable survey evidence indicates that though Americans strongly sup- 
port business, they do not take corporate misbehavior lightly. 
In assessing public reactions to corporate wrongdoing, the treatment ac- 
corded corporate misbehavior is often compared with the punishment of individ- 
ual wrongdoing. Consider the divergent responses to the Department of Justice's 
handling of the E. F. Hutton "check-kiting" scheme (U.S. Congress:House 
1985). In that case, Hutton employees systematically and intentionally shuffled 
checks among banks. By deceiving two or more banks into temporarily recording 
the same funds, they created as much as $10 billion in overdrafts. After the 
scheme was uncovered, the Justice Department imposed only civil financial pen- 
alties. 
Some commentators defended the Justice Department's handling of the Hut- 
ton affair, maintaining that the involvement of a corporation made the case unique 
and pointing out that the compensation package the Justice Department worked 
out was of substantial benefit to the financial community. In their view, justice 
was done in treating Hutton differently. 
However, criticism of the Hutton deal was strong and revolved around com- 
parisons of E. F. Hutton's treatment to that of hypothetical, similarly guilty in- 
dividuals. Critics pointed out that if individuals had engaged in such massive and 
premeditated check-kiting, they would surely have been criminally charged and 
even subjected to jail sentences (U.S. Congress: House, 1985). As one Senator 
put it, "I can name eight of my clients, when I was a lawyer, who went to jail for 
check-kiting.... I'm supposed to go around talking about jailing people for drunk 
driving, and you can go out and steal a million dollars and it's, hey, see you 
around the club" (Welch, 1985, p. A14). In a public opinion survey conducted 
shortly after the Hutton affair, a clear plurality (45%) of those who had heard 
about the case declared that Hutton's punishment was too lenient; only 3% said 
it was too stiff (Roper & Miller, 1985). 
Public attitudes toward instances of corporate versus individual wrongdoing 
are critically important on both theoretical and practical grounds. On a theoretical 
level, analysis of judgments of corporate versus individual wrongdoing helps to 
illuminate how people consider the identity of the actor in making attributions of 
responsibility (Shaver, 1985). Does the fact that a corporation rather than an 
individual engages in a particular behavior fundamentally transform the blame- 
worthiness of the behavior, even if the action itself is identical? Social psychol- 
ogists who study the perception of groups may also benefit by learning under what 
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circumstances groups such as corporations are perceived differently or measured 
by distinct standards. Most work on the perception of groups to date has focused 
on intergroup relations. This work shows that after categorizing people into 
groups, observers tend to assume intragroup similarity and to accentuate differ- 
ences between groups (Deschamps, 1984; Wilder, 1986). However, judgments of 
the responsibility of individuals compared to groups have not been investigated 
systematically. 
Attitudes toward corporate wrongdoing are also important to the operation of 
the legal system. Prosecutors consider public attitudes when deciding whether to 
charge someone with a crime (Jacoby, 1980; Pritchard, 1986). Potential plaintiffs 
may base their decision to sue on their definitions of wrongdoing, their attitudes 
toward corporations, and their perceived likelihood of success. As representa- 
tives of the public, civil and criminal juries reflect community sentiments in their 
decisions, particularly if the facts of the case are close (Hans & Vidmar, 1986; 
Kalven & Zeisel, 1966). Finally, perceptions that corporations are treated favor- 
ably may undermine the legal system's legitimacy, which in turn could encourage 
disobedience to laws (Cullen et al., 1987; Tyler, 1987). 
Sources of Differential Reactions to Individual Versus 
Corporate Wrongdoing 
Both the theoretical and empirical literature on corporate crime suggest that 
people may view corporate wrongdoing distinctively for a variety of reasons. The 
most obvious is that individuals and corporations frequently engage in different 
behaviors. Schrager and Short (1978) observed that the diffuse economic harm 
caused by corporate entities is likely to elicit milder punitive reactions than the 
focused bodily harm associated with individuals involved in street crime. 
Another prominent explanation for differential reactions involves the typi- 
cally greater financial resources of the corporation, which may lead to a so-called 
"deep pockets" effect. It is commonly claimed that juries award plaintiffs who 
sue corporations larger sums of money because the jurors believe that the cor- 
porations, with their "deep pockets," can afford more (cf. Chin & Peterson, 
1985). Rand Corporation researchers analyzed jury verdicts in Cook County, 
Illinois, during the 1960s and 1970s, and discovered that claims for serious per- 
sonal injuries resulted in larger awards when the defendants were corporations or 
governments rather than individuals (Chin & Peterson, 1985; Hammitt, Carroll, & 
Relies, 1985). 
A third set of explanations for differential treatment focuses on the nonfinan- 
cial resource superiority of organizations over individuals. Because corporations 
typically consist of a number of individuals with specialized skills and are orga- 
nized in a rational structure, they could be presumed to possess greater rational- 
ity, greater foresight, and better ability to anticipate the consequences of their 
endeavors than individuals. All these features, according to attribution theory, 
should enhance judgments of responsibility. Some of the research findings on 
organizational behavior challenge the presumption of greater corporate rationality 
(Ermann & Lundman, 1982). Nonetheless, what might appear as an accidental act 
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if committed by an individual may seem purposeful when a group of people engage 
in the act. 
Psychological research suggests several ways that judgments about groups 
and individuals might differ. Individual members of a group should benefit from 
diffusion of responsibility within the group (Darley & Latane, 1968) and should 
receive fewer dispositional attributions (Wilder, 1987). Therefore, individuals 
within the group should be held less culpable for wrongdoing. However, for 
serious harms, the group as a whole should be attributed greater responsibility 
than a similarly situated individual. In assigning responsibility for an extreme 
event, people tend to infer the existence of multiple necessary causes such as 
might be present in group efforts. For example, in studies exploring the popularity 
of conspiracy theories of presidential assassinations, McCauley and Jacques 
(1979) discovered that groups were seen as more effective than individuals (see 
also Latane, 1981). 
An additional contributor to distinctive responses, which is related to differ- 
ential resources, involves assumptions about the impact of punishment. Consid- 
ering the deterrent effect of sanctions, the same monetary fine will have differ- 
ential force depending on the financial status of the perpetrator. In retributive 
terms, if corporations are better able to foresee the consequences of their actions, 
then they should be punished more severely for their violations. This is consistent 
with the link between intentionality and sanctions that characterizes both the 
criminal and the civil justice systems (Epstein, Gregory, & Kalven, 1984; Kaplan 
& Weisberg, 1986; Shaver, 1985). 
Some commentators have argued that, for several reasons, corporate actors 
might be particularly sensitive to threats of punishment. Compared to street crim- 
inals, corporate wrongdoers may face greater costs if their crimes are detected. 
Their illegal activities may not be as deeply embedded in their lifestyles. Hence, 
corporate lawbreakers may be more easily deterred (Cullen et al., 1987). Beliefs 
about the efficacy of specific and general deterrence of corporate actors may 
influence the likelihood of sanctioning. 
The discussion so far suggests that if corporations and individuals commit the 
same actions, the corporations might be viewed more negatively than the indi- 
viduals. Yet the criminal justice system's individualistic orientation to criminal 
responsibility may produce more favorable reactions to corporations under some 
circumstances. Consider the Ford Motor Company's trial on reckless homicide 
charges related to a Ford Pinto gas tank explosion. After the jury acquitted the 
company, commentators speculated that it might have been difficult for the jury 
to find criminal intent and impose criminal liability with a corporate entity when 
those judgments traditionally have been associated with individuals (Cullen et al., 
1987; Swigert & Farrell, 1980-1981). 
Finally, general attitudes toward business, corporations, and punishment 
may lead people to treat corporate wrongdoing in particular ways. Probusiness 
sentiment may lead to lenient treatment, while antibusiness attitudes may create 
harshness. Experience and familiarity with business may cut both ways, either 
producing an insistence that appropriate standards of business conduct be main- 
tained, or generating sympathy for those operating in a business context. General 
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attitudes toward punishment may also be implicated in responses to corporate 
wrongdoing. 
Comparing the Individual and the Corporation 
Scholars are only beginning to isolate the varying sources of potentially dis- 
tinctive reactions to corporate wrongdoing that we have outlined above. In the 
"real world," many differences between individual and corporate behavior make 
it nearly impossible to equate them and to explore the issue of differential treat- 
ment. In the current study, we overcame this problem by constructing two almost 
identical scenarios in which workers were harmed. Half of the participants read a 
scenario in which "Mr. Jones" harmed the workers, and the other half read that 
the "Jones Corporation" did so. Otherwise, all aspects of the scenario, including 
the behavior of the key actor and the harm to the workers, were identical. This 
experimental design enabled us to explore whether our subjects responded dif- 
ferently to corporate versus individual wrongdoing. 
METHOD 
Respondents 
Respondents in the experiment were 202 students enrolled in an introductory 
sociology course at a northeastern university. Being a general education course, 
it comprised students from many disciplines. Sixty-eight percent were female. 
Twenty percent were majoring in business or economics, and 30.8% anticipated a 
career in business. The students described themselves predominantly as middle 
class (42.3%) or upper middle class (49.0%). Approximately equal numbers de- 
scribed themselves as liberal (34.8%), moderate (33.3%), or conservative (31.7%). 
The study was conducted during a regular class period, without prior an- 
nouncement. Students who agreed to participate signed a Certificate of Informed 
Consent before beginning the study. All but one returned valid questionnaires, 
resulting in 201 people in the sample. 
Materials 
The respondents first read one of two versions of an incident in which the key 
actor hired five workers to clear a newly purchased lot cluttered with debris. In 
half the cases, "Mr. Jones" hired the workers; in the other half, the "Jones 
Corporation" hired them. 
After two weeks on the job, four of the workers complained to Jones that they 
felt a little lightheaded and dizzy while they were clearing the debris. Jones told 
them to continue working but to notify him/it if they felt worse. By the third week, 
three of the workers began to have visible tremors and difficulty breathing. They 
were subsequently hospitalized for about two weeks with severe respiratory prob- 
lems. Follow-up physical examinations of all five workers revealed some perma- 
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nent lung damage, ranging from minor damage in two workers to moderate dam- 
age in the three who were hospitalized. 
City and federal inspectors analyzed the debris on the lot and discovered 
significant amounts of a highly toxic substance. Persons exposed to this substance 
often experienced dizziness and respiratory problems similar to those of Jones's 
workers. As a result of the incident, the workers decided to sue Jones in civil 
court to obtain compensation. In addition, the local prosecutor decided to bring 
charges of criminal negligence against Jones. 
Respondents were asked to suppose that they had been called as jurors to 
decide this case in civil court. They were told that the five workers had sued Jones 
for compensation for their hospital bills, their doctor bills, and their pain and 
suffering. The plaintiffs' attorneys argued that Jones should have foreseen that the 
lot might contain toxic waste and that he/it was reckless in failing to check the lot 
before hiring the workers. Jones also should have checked out the workers' com- 
plaints before sending them back to work. Therefore, they argued that Jones was 
liable for the workers' hospital and doctor bills totalling $80,000. Furthermore, the 
lawyers argued that Jones should also compensate the workers for their pain and 
suffering. They said that the three workers were hospitalized and who had the 
most severe lung damage should receive $100,000 each, and that the two workers 
who had minor lung damage should receive $30,000 each. Thus, they asked Jones 
to pay $80,000 in medical expenses and $360,000 for pain and suffering, for a total 
of $440,000. 
The attorney for Jones said his client would pay the hospital bills of the three 
workers, which amounted to $40,000, but he disputed the other medical claims 
and said that Jones should not be required to pay them. Jones also disputed that 
the workers' lung damage was entirely the result of exposure to the toxic waste, 
pointing out that the three workers who had the most severe reactions were all 
cigarette smokers. 
We then asked respondents whether, in their opinion, Mr. Jones/the Jones 
Corporation was liable for the claims of the workers, and if so, how many claims 
they considered justified. We also asked respondents to provide a dollar amount 
of the award they would give in each category of hospital bills, doctor bills, pain 
and suffering, and total award. 
Following these decisions, we told respondents to imagine that they were 
hearing the criminal case of People v. Mr. Jones/The Jones Corporation based on 
the same incident. The prosecutor argued that Jones acted in a reckless, irrespon- 
sible fashion in hiring the workers to remove debris from the empty lot without 
checking to make sure that the debris was not toxic. He also argued that Jones 
was irresponsible because Jones allowed the workers to continue clearing debris 
after they had complained of physical problems. The prosecutor asked the jury to 
find Jones guilty of criminal negligence. Jones, however, argued that he/it should 
be found not guilty. Jones maintained that there was no reason to suspect that the 
lot held toxic material, and that he/it had not behaved in a reckless fashion. 
Respondents then made judgments about whether Jones was guilty of crim- 
inal negligence and indicated their recommendations for punishment. They also 
answered 16 additional questions designed to tap their perceptions of the incident 
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and the legal responsibility of the actors and ranked the key actors in terms of how 




There were strong, statistically significant differences in the civil judgments 
between respondents reading the Mr. Jones version and those reading the Jones 
Corporation version. The Jones Corporation was held liable for a greater number 
of claims (Jones Corporation M = 3.96; Mr. Jones M = 3.32; F (1, 199) = 19.54, 
p < .001). As shown in Table 1, workers suing the Jones Corporation were 
awarded consistently larger compensation in all categories than workers suing Mr. 
Jones. The most marked difference occurred when the respondents were given the 
greatest latitude-in the "pain and suffering" category. In this category, the 
average award against the Jones Corporation was more than twice that against 
Mr. Jones. 
Criminal Judgments 
A similar pattern of greater severity toward the corporation was found in the 
guilt judgments of criminal negligence. Respondents made assessments on a 5- 
point scale, where 1 corresponded to "definitely not guilty," and 5 corresponded 
to "definitely guilty" of criminal negligence. The Jones Corporation (M = 3.51) 
was much more likely to be seen as guilty of criminal negligence than Mr. Jones 
(M = 2.67; F (1, 199) = 26.80, p < .001). 
The Deep Pockets Phenomenon 
Table 2 (Part A) reveals that Mr. Jones and Jones Corporation respondents 
exhibited considerable divergence in their views of the financial dimensions of the 
incident. Not surprisingly, respondents perceived that Mr. Jones and the Jones 
Corporation would have different financial resources and different abilities to 
weather the impact of financial penalties, in that they believed that the Jones 
Corporation was more likely to be insured against the workers' claims, and that 
Mr. Jones was much more likely to go bankrupt as a result of the incident. 
Table 1. Awards to Workers as a Function of Individual or Corporate Wrongdoing 
Category of award Mr. Jones Jones Corp. F-value 
Hospital bills $ 38,069 $ 40,000 5.78a 
Doctor bills $ 31,337 $ 36.910 8.78a 
Pain and suffering $ 82,178 $170,700 21.97a 
Total award $151,584 $247,610 24.00a 
ap < .01. 
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Table 2. Perceptions of the Incident as a Function of Individual or Corporate Wrongdoing" 
Item Mr. Jones Jones Corp. F-value 
A. Deep Pockets 
Likelihood of insurance 2.25 3.20 31.39b 
Likelihood of bankruptcy 3.07 1.76 93.42b 
Fair to sue 3.71 4.13 9.46b 
Fairness of claims 2.77 3.35 13.37b 
Fairness of offer 2.95 2.13 32.67b 
B. Judgments of Wrongdoing 
Knew beforehand 1.52 1.89 11.26b 
Recklessness 2.50 3.08 15.80b 
Morally wrong 2.28 2.78 12.85b 
Deserves punishment 2.38 3.04 27.61b 
Harm to workers 3.87 3.78 <1.00 
Fairness of crim. charge 2.21 2.91 16.19b 
C. Consequences of Incident 
Regret over incident 3.96 3.60 6.83b 
Effect on reputation 3.55 3.52 <1.00 
Individual deterrence 4.67 4.45 5.73b 
General deterrence 3.79 3.64 1.10 
a The higher the number, the more likely, more fair, more reckless, more regretful, etc. 
bp < .02. 
Subjects also interpreted the fairness of the workers' claims and the Jones 
offer in line with their supposed resources. They were more likely to agree that it 
was fair to sue the Jones Corporation than it was to sue Mr. Jones. Furthermore, 
they saw the workers' claims against the Jones Corporation as more reasonable 
than the identical claims against Mr. Jones. Finally, they saw Mr. Jones's offer to 
settle the claims for $40,000 as more reasonable than the Jones Corporation's offer 
to settle for the same amount. All these results are consistent with a deep pockets 
or cost-spreading explanation of differential reaction to the corporation. 
Judgments of Wrongdoing 
As shown in Table 2 (Part B), the Jones Corporation was rated as somewhat 
more likely than Mr. Jones to have known beforehand that the workers might be 
harmed. Respondents saw the Jones Corporation as more reckless, more morally 
wrong, and more deserving of punishment than Mr. Jones. However, respondents 
did not judge the harm done to the workers any differently. The prosecutor's 
action of bringing a criminal charge was more likely to be perceived as fair when 
it was directed against the Jones Corporation than against Mr. Jones, despite legal 
practice to the contrary. Respondents' rank ordering of the responsibility of legal 
actors did not differ significantly between the two conditions. 
Consequences of the Incident 
To study perceptions of the likely deterrent effects of the incident, we asked 
several questions about the aftermath of the incident and the trials. Subjects 
158 
CORPORATE WRONGDOING 
estimated how much regret Jones suffered, how much the incident would affect 
Jones's reputation in the community, and whether Jones's behavior and the be- 
havior of other individuals (or corporations) would be affected by the incident. 
The results are shown in Table 2 (Part C). Mr. Jones was seen as more regretful 
than the Jones Corporation and he was judged as less likely to engage in similar 
behavior in the future. Hence, in contrast to speculations that corporate actors 
might be more sensitive to the impact of sanctions, our respondents believed that 
the incident would have greater deterrent impact on Mr. Jones. However, the 
incident was expected to affect the reputation of Mr. Jones and the Jones Cor- 
poration in the same (negative) manner. Furthermore, on our measure of general 
deterrence, subjects judged that other individuals-or other corporations-would 
be similarly affected by hearing about this incident. 
Predictors of Scenario Judgments 
The data we have reported so far indicate striking differences in reactions to 
individual and corporate wrongdoing. Regression analyses allowed us to examine 
in more detail the relationships among responses to various items and to test in a 
preliminary fashion some of the arguments about why judgments of the individual 
and the corporation were consistently different. For these analyses, we combined 
responses to selected questions that represented four conceptually distinct fac- 
tors. These factors were derived from research literature in psychology, law, and 
criminology that indicated their importance in judgments of wrongdoing. The first 
variable, consisting of questions about knowing beforehand about possible harm 
and about Jones's recklessness, was labeled "Recklessness." A second variable, 
"Harm," consisted of the single item about how much the workers had been 
harmed. The third factor, combining the insurance and bankruptcy questions, was 
labeled "Finances." Finally, the fourth factor, "Deterrence," included questions 
about the actor's regret, the actor's likelihood of repeating the act, the likelihood 
of similar others engaging in the act, and the effect on the actor's reputation. 
We then used the four factors of Recklessness, Harm, Finances, and Deter- 
rence as predictor variables in stepwise regression equations for respondents' 
judgments of civil liability, total award, and criminal negligence. Results of the 
regression analyses are presented in Table 3. The most striking consistency was 
the strong relationship between the Recklessness factor and judgments of civil 
liability, total award, and criminal negligence in both the Mr. Jones and the Jones 
Corporation conditions. Regression coefficients ranged from .43 to .59, indicating 
the robust and steady impact of Recklessness judgments across the different 
conditions and types of decisions. 
For judgments of civil liability and total award, when all data were considered 
together (Table 3, Column 1), Recklessness was the only significant predictor, 
accounting for 27% of the variance in civil liability judgments and 24% of the 
variation in total award. For judgments of criminal negligence, Recklessness 
continued to be the most important predictor, with 31% of the variance, but 
Deterrence also proved to be a significant predictor, accounting for an additional 
2% of the variation in estimates of criminal negligence. 
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Table 3. Predictors of Scenario Judgmentsa 
Factor All data Mr. Jones Jones Corp. 
A. Civil Liability 
Recklessness .52b .48b .45b 
Harm 
Finances .19c -.22b 
Deterrence 
B. Total Award 




C. Criminal Negligence 
Recklessness .57b .59b .45b 
Harm 
Finances - .27b 
Deterrence .15S 
a Entries are standardized regression coefficients (beta weights) of variables in the final equations in 
stepwise regression analyses. All items were coded for the analyses so that higher numbers indicate 
greater civil and criminal liability, higher awards, more financial resources, more deterrence, etc. 
p < .01. 
Cp < .05. 
Separate stepwise regression analyses for respondents in the Mr. Jones and 
the Jones Corporation conditions produced similar overall patterns, but a few 
differences should be noted. In the Mr. Jones condition (Table 3, Column 2), 
Recklessness was a significant predictor, accounting for 27% of the variance in 
Civil Liability responses, but Finances also emerged as a significant factor, ex- 
plaining an additional 4% of the variation. The greater the perceived financial 
resources of Mr. Jones, the greater the judgments of his civil liability, consistent 
with a deep pockets explanation. For the Mr. Jones respondents, Recklessness 
was the only significant predictor of total award and criminal negligence, account- 
ing for 19% and 34% of the variance respectively. 
Recklessness continued to be an important predictor for the Jones Corpora- 
tion respondents (Table 3, Column 3), accounting for 20% of the variation in all 
three judgments of civil liability, total award, and criminal negligence. For the 
Jones Corporation respondents, Finances was a secondary significant predictor of 
judgments of civil liability and criminal negligence, accounting for an additional 
5% and 7% of the variance, respectively. 
However, the impact of Finances was opposite to that which would be ex- 
pected from a deep pockets analysis. If financial resources was an important and 
independent consideration that pushed awards upward, we should have observed 
strong positive relationships between respondents' estimates of Finances and 
their civil judgments, particularly total award. However, the relationships be- 
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tween presumed financial resources and judgments of wrongdoing were negative: 
The less the perceived resources of the Jones Corporation, the greater the judg- 
ments of civil liability and criminal negligence. Also of note was the fact that total 
award and Finances were not significantly related in the Jones Corporation con- 
dition (r = -.05, n.s.). This pattern of responses suggests that in their Finances 
ratings, the Jones Corporation respondents were reflecting an evaluative assess- 
ment (e.g., a terrible fly-by-night corporation like Jones that would harm workers 
would not bother to be insured). 
The combined results of the regression analyses indicate that the most im- 
portant factor underlying all decisions was the respondent's judgment of reckless- 
ness. What does this suggest about the consistent differences between the Mr. 
Jones and the Jones Corporation conditions? Our conjecture is that respondents 
made assessments of recklessness within the specific context of individual or 
corporate misbehavior, apparently applying a different standard of care to the 
two types of actors. Those recklessness judgments then determined their deci- 
sions about criminal and civil culpability and the total award. Other consider- 
ations such as financial resources and deterrence appeared to play only a modest 
independent role. 
The Influence of Individual Differences 
To assess the effects of attitudinal and demographic variables, we examined 
the relationships between these variables within the Mr. Jones and Jones Corpo- 
ration conditions for respondents' assessments of civil liability, total award, and 
criminal negligence. Respondents' ratings of the ethical and moral practices of 
corporate executives and of small business proprietors were generally unrelated 
to their scenario judgments. Respondents' gender and social class were also un- 
related. 
Political liberalism-conservatism was significantly associated with judgments 
of civil liability and total award, but only in the Jones Corporation condition. In 
that condition, the more conservative the respondent, the lower the assessment of 
civil liability and the lower the total award (r = - .28 and - .33 respectively, both 
p's < .01). In the Mr. Jones condition, both correlations were nonsignificant (r = 
-.06 and -.03, n.s.). Correlations between political orientation and criminal 
negligence judgments, however, were not statistically significant in either of the 
two conditions (r = -.10 and -.16, n.s., for Mr. Jones and Jones Corporation 
conditions). This configuration of results indicates an association between polit- 
ical liberalism-conservatism and judgments of corporate but not individual civil 
wrongs. 
Another interesting pattern of results emerged when we compared those 
respondents who were majoring in business and were planning a business career 
(N = 31) with the remainder of the sample. Although their judgments of criminal 
and civil culpability were no different, the total awards of the business-oriented 
respondents were significantly higher (M = $242,580) than the awards of the 
others (M = $192,581; F (1, 197) = 5.54, p = .02). If we assume that the business- 
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oriented respondents had a more accurate assessment of the values of the claims, 
then the respondents who were more naive about business were apparently un- 
dervaluing the workers' claims. To further explore the impact of business knowl- 
edge and experience on judgments of corporate wrongdoing, it will be necessary 
to examine the reactions of other populations that have more familiarity with 
business. 
DISCUSSION 
Even though our research provides an interesting new approach to studying 
attitudes toward corporate wrongdoing and its results converge with studies em- 
ploying different methodologies, we want to note some limitations of the study 
before we discuss its broader implications. Although our study employed juror 
simulation methodology, we did not intend the study to be a highly realistic 
simulation of actual jury decision making. We used a student sample. In addition, 
although our respondents received much richer descriptions than participants in 
other crime-seriousness studies, the scenario presented less information than in a 
real trial court. Jurors would never serve in both civil and criminal proceedings, 
as our respondents did in the present experiment. And given current legal prac- 
tices, the particular case we employed might not find its way to court. 
Bray and Kerr (1982) and Lind and Tyler (1988) have argued convincingly 
that experiments need not exactly duplicate the real world to be valid. Further- 
more, we doubt that the nature of the sample was responsible for the overall 
pattern of results. Studies comparing student ratings of crime seriousness to those 
of other subpopulations (Rossi et al., 1974; Sellin & Wolfgang, 1964) show similar 
response patterns, suggesting the appropriateness of student samples for experi- 
mental work. Although in future studies we hope to replicate the research with 
other populations and scenarios, we would maintain that the experimental method 
as we have employed it here is uniquely valuable in providing an analytical in- 
strument to unpack the public's complex response to corporate wrongdoing. 
The results of our experiment suggest that people have a strong, distinctive 
reaction to corporate wrongdoing. Even when their actions are identical, corpo- 
rations and individuals are judged in divergent ways. Our respondents held the 
corporation to a higher standard, judged it to be more reckless and more morally 
wrong in its behaviors, and punished it more severely. Respondents defined reck- 
lessness differently for individuals and corporations, and these judgments of reck- 
lessness played a pivotal role in driving respondents' decisions about liability and 
negligence in the scenario case. The importance of recklessness in the present 
study converges with attribution research showing that intentionality is a key 
factor in the assignment of blame. 
The discovery that our respondents reacted very negatively to corporate 
wrongdoing is consistent both with recent public opinion survey findings of hos- 
tility to corporate misbehavior and with research on people's attitudes toward 
white-collar and business crime. General favorability toward business evident 
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from survey studies does not appear to produce leniency toward business wrong- 
doing in individual cases. Interpreted broadly, the results of this study lend weight 
to the voices of many current scholars who argue that public unwillingness to 
sanction corporate misbehavior is a myth. 
In the introduction we outlined a number of reasons why the corporate or 
individual identity of the wrongdoer might alter perceptions of wrongdoing, in- 
cluding financial and nonfinancial resource advantages, attributional phenomena, 
negative stereotypes of corporations, assumptions about the impact of punish- 
ment, and the individualistic orientation of the criminal justice system. It is useful 
to assess the extent to which our findings are consistent with these various 
sources of distinctive treatment. 
The resource advantages of the corporation could explain why respondents 
defined recklessness differently for the corporation and the individual. If respon- 
dents presumed that the corporation possessed greater rationality and superior 
ability to foresee the consequences of its actions, they may have felt justified in 
insisting on a higher standard. Consistent with this possibility, our respondents 
indicated that the corporation was more likely to have known beforehand that the 
workers might be harmed. 
However, an alternative explanation is also possible: that negative stereo- 
types of the corporation predisposed some of our respondents to perceive ambig- 
uous corporate behavior skeptically. Certainly the apparent cynicism toward cor- 
porations revealed by our respondents fits with this alternative analysis. Respon- 
dents believed that the Jones Corporation was less regretful and more likely to 
engage in similar behavior in the future than Mr. Jones. In this light, the respon- 
dents' judgments that the corporation was more likely to have known beforehand 
may have reflected not so much their views of the superior abilities of the cor- 
poration but their beliefs about its greater propensity for maltreatment. 
If negative stereotypes of corporations were responsible for the respondents' 
advocacy of harsher treatment of the Jones Corporation, we should have seen 
significant relationships between our respondents' attitudes toward the corpora- 
tion and their scenario judgments. However, their ratings of the ethical and moral 
practices of corporate executives and of small business proprietors were not 
associated with their evaluations of the Jones Corporation. Interestingly enough, 
the respondents' political conservatism was significantly related to their judg- 
ments of corporate (but not individual) wrongdoing. The more liberal the respon- 
dents, the more they believed that the corporation was civilly liable and the more 
money they awarded to the plaintiffs. Political liberalism may predispose respon- 
dents to adopt an expansive view of corporate responsibility. 
On the basis of our data, we cannot designate either perceptions of resource 
superiority or negative stereotypes as the motivating force behind differential 
treatment of the corporation. However, it is interesting to note that both of these 
factors are likely to produce greater demands on the corporation for compensation 
for wrongdoing. 
As for the deep pockets effect, our respondents clearly differentiated the 
available financial resources of Mr. Jones and the Jones Corporation and awarded 
plaintiffs suing the corporation more compensation. Nevertheless, the regression 
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analyses indicated no consistent effect of presumed resources on awards. Instead, 
higher awards in the Jones Corporation condition were linked more strongly to 
recklessness judgments, suggesting that they functioned more to punish reckless 
behavior than to pick a deep pocket. Future research varying financial and non- 
financial resources of individuals and corporations could address the importance 
of each type of resource to judgments of wrongdoing. But our study hints that 
those who claim deep pockets influence jury awards may be neglecting to take 
into account a coexisting and more critical determinant: higher expectations of 
corporate behavior. 
The finding that a group such as a corporation is attributed more responsi- 
bility than an individual for the same action has some suggestive implications for 
psychological theory. Although these effects could be due to the subjects' knowl- 
edge of resources or stereotypes of individuals and corporations, another possi- 
bility to be explored in future research is that the process of social categorization 
leads to inferences that groups and group actions have greater impact (Latane, 
1981; Wilder, 1986). 
There were some clues in the data that people may have distinctive prefer- 
ences for punishing the corporation. The corporation was perceived to be less 
regretful and more likely to engage in similar harmful actions in the future, indi- 
cating the need for stronger sanctions to deter behavior. There was no evidence 
that the corporation benefited from the criminal justice system's individualistic 
orientation: Respondents were more likely to support criminal charges against the 
Jones Corporation than against Mr. Jones. 
Our study bolsters arguments advanced in a recent theoretical paper by Don- 
ald Black (1987). Relying on historical and cross-cultural data, the author points 
out that although once families and clans provided some relief for individual 
misfortune, there was a historical shift toward individual responsibility, which 
reached its zenith in the nineteenth century. Since that time, there has been steady 
movement toward a different source of collective responsibility-the organiza- 
tion. Black perceives the contemporary expansion of theories of liability for or- 
ganizations and the greater willingness of citizens to seek compensation from 
organizations for harm as part of a full circle, from one kind of collective respon- 
sibility (the family or kinship groups) to another (organizations). He proposes that 
as a consequence of these historical changes, we should now perceive the liability 
of groups to be greater than the liability of individuals. Our study provides striking 
support for Black's assertion by demonstrating that even under conditions of 
identical action and harm, the corporation is held more culpable than the individ- 
ual. 
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